The interocular traumatic test

“The preceding paragraph illustrates a procedure that statisticians of all schools find important but elusive. It has been called the interocular traumatic test; you know what the data mean when the conclusion hits you between the eyes. The interocular traumatic test is simple, commands general agreement, and is often applicable; well-conducted experiments often come out that way. But the enthusiast’s interocular trauma may be the skeptic’s random error. A little arithmetic to verify the extent of the trauma can yield great peace of mind for little cost.” (Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963, p.217, who attribute the “test” to J. Berkson, personal comm., 14 July 1958)

Edwards, W., Lindman, H., & Savage, L. J. (1963). Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research. Psychological Review, 70(3), 193.

TBE QEDs

‘In TBE [theory-based evaluation] practice […] theory as represented is not specific enough to support causal conclusions in inference […]. For example, in contribution analysis “causal assumptions” refer to a “causal package” consisting of the program intervention and a set of contextual conditions that together may explain an observed change in the outcome […]. In realist evaluation, the causal mechanisms that are triggered by the intervention are specified in “configuration” with their context and the outcome. Often, however, the causal structure of the configuration is not clear […]. Moreover, the main TBE approaches to inference do not have standard practices, conventions, for treating bias in evidence […].

‘TBE practitioners may borrow from other methods to test theoretical assumptions […]. Sometimes TBE employs regression analysis or quasi-experimental propensity score matching in inference (our running example in this article of an actual TBE program evaluation does so).’

Schmidt, R. (2024). A graphical method for causal program attribution in theory-based evaluation. Evaluation, online first.

 

Is a theory of change different to a logic model? Depends

Evaluation purists: It’s only a Logic Model if it comes from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation region of Michigan, otherwise it’s just sparkling boxes and arrows.

Alternatively:

“A program theory is an explicit theory or model of how an intervention contributes to a set of specific outcomes through a series of intermediate results. The theory needs to include an explanation of how the program’s activities contribute to the results, not simply a list of activities followed by the results, with no explanation of how these are linked, apart from a mysterious arrow.” (Funnell & Rogers, 2011, p. 31)

“A program theory is usually displayed in a diagram called a logic model.” (Funnell & Rogers, 2011, p. 32)

“… sometimes the terms logic model and theory of change have been distinguished in particular ways that are different to the ways we are using the terms here. For example Heléne Clark, from ActKnowledge, and Andrea Anderson, from the Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change, who employ program theory extensively, have used these terms to make the distinction between ways of representing program theory that we have labeled pipeline logic models and outcomes chain logic models (Clark and Anderson, 2004). Mhairi Mackenzie and Avril Blamey (2005) have used theories of change to refer specifically to the type of logic model advocated by the Aspen Institute […]. The key message here is to define your terms carefully and ask others to do so as well. It cannot be assumed that you mean the same thing when you use the same term or that you mean something different when you use a different term.” (Funnell & Rogers, 2011, p. 26)

Funnell, S. C., & Rogers, P. J. (2011). Purposeful Program Theory: Effective Use of Theories of Change and Logic Models. Jossey-Bass.

Ignorance of history in evaluation

“Despite occasional statements that program theory is a new approach, its roots go back more than fifty years. […] The history of program theory evaluation is not one of a steady increase in understanding. Instead, many of the key ideas have been well articulated and then ignored or forgotten in descriptions of the approach. It is not unusual to have statements that demonstrate a lack of knowledge of previous empirical and theoretical developments, such as a call for proposals from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2008) that claimed that “‘theory-based evaluation’ is a relatively new approach” (p. 14).”

Sue C. Funnell and Patricia J. Rogers (2011, pp. 15–16). Purposeful Program Theory: Effective Use of Theories of Change and Logic Models. Jossey-Bass.

Something other than gross self-indulgence

“More than anything, I’m excited. I’m excited to see how life is going to be different for the queer, trans, and even cis kids too, growing up in a world that has more language for gender variance. I’m excited to find out what sort of lives they will lead, from the genderqueer activists in the audience at my last reading to the barista with the orange mohawk who handed me the cup of tea I’m clutching for dear life as I write alone in this café, trying to believe that writing this piece is something other than gross self-indulgence.

“The barista is wearing two name badges. One says their name; the other one says, in thick chalk capitals, I am not a girl. My pronouns are They/Them.”

– Laurie Penny (2015), How To Be A Genderqueer Feminist

On the term “randomista”

Sophie Webber and Carolyn Prouse (2018, p. 169, footnote 1) write:

“Randomistas is a slang term used by critics to describe proponents of the RCT methodology. It is almost certainly a gendered, derogatory term intended to flippantly dismiss experimental economists and their success, particularly Esther Duflo, one of the most successful experts on randomization.” [Emphasis original.]

References

Sophie Webber and Carolyn Prouse (2018). The New Gold Standard: The Rise of Randomized Control Trials and Experimental Development. Economic Geography, 94(2), 166–187.

Philip Larkin on how to write poetry

Philip Larkin interview excerpt in Paris Review (Issue 84, Summer 1982):

Yes, I was afraid you’d ask about writing. Anything I say about writing poems is bound to be retrospective, because in fact I’ve written very little since moving into this house, or since High Windows, or since 1974, whichever way you like to put it. But when I did write them, well, it was in the evenings, after work, after washing up (I’m sorry: you would call this “doing the dishes”). It was a routine like any other. And really it worked very well: I don’t think you can write a poem for more than two hours. After that you’re going round in circles, and it’s much better to leave it for twenty-four hours, by which time your subconscious or whatever has solved the block and you’re ready to go on.

The best writing conditions I ever had were in Belfast, when I was working at the University there. Another top-floor flat, by the way. I wrote between eight and ten in the evenings, then went to the University bar till eleven, then played cards or talked with friends till one or two. The first part of the evening had the second part to look forward to, and I could enjoy the second part with a clear conscience because I’d done my two hours. I can’t seem to organize that now.

Martin Creed defines dadaism

Vic Reeves: “You got anything that’s Dadaesque in here?”

Martin Creed: “Er, I don’t, well, I don’t know about, I don’t know, maybe a lot of it is because I think it’s sort of a bit stupid.”

Vic Reeves: “Yeah.”

Martin Creed: “You know? I think that’s what Dada is. Aye, like being stupid.”

Vic Reeves: “But there’s political meaning and then you’ve got to balance that with the daftness or the stupidness.”

Martin Creed: “Right, aye.”

Vic Reeves: “Cos I’d probably fall on the daft side.”

Martin Creed: “I would go…I think I would definitely fall on the stupid side.”

Vic Reeves: “You’d be even further, right the other end!”

Martin Creed: “Yeah. Cos I think it’s like more, you know, it’s more like life, cos life’s stupid.”

– Gaga for Dada: The Original Art Rebels (2016) 

“I feel sure that I shall meet Morcom again”

Thurs 13 Feb 1930, Alan Turing’s first (and unrequited) love Christopher Morcom died. Turing was 17. “I feel sure that I shall meet Morcom again somewhere and that there will be some work for us to do together…” (Hodges, 1983/2014, pp. 61-62):

Dear Mother,

I wrote to Mrs Morcom as you suggested and it has given me a certain relief. […] I feel sure that I shall meet Morcom again and that there will be work for us to do together, and as I believed there was for us to do here. Now that I am left to do it alone I must not let him down but put as much energy into it, if not as much interest, as if he were still here. If I succeed I shall be more fit to enjoy his company than I am now. I remember what G O’H said to me once ‘Be not weary of well doing for in due ye shall reap if ye faint not’ and Bennett who is very kind on these occasions ‘Heaviness may endure for a night but joy cometh in the morning’. Rather Plymouth brotherish perhaps. I am sorry he is leaving. It never seems to have occurred to me to try and make any other friends besides Morcom, he made everyone seem so ordinary […].

References

Andrew Hodges (1983/2014). Alan Turing: the Enigma. Princeton University Press.