“It may seem strange that we are trying to understand causality using causal models, which clearly already encode causal relationships. Our reasoning is not circular. Our aim is not to reduce causation to noncausal concepts but to interpret questions about causes of specific events in fully specified scenarios in terms of generic causal knowledge…” (Halpern & Pearl, 2005).
“It may seem circular to use causal models, which clearly already encode causal information, to define actual causation. Nevertheless, there is no circularity. The models do not directly represent relations of actual causation. Rather, they encode information about what would happen under various possible interventions” (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2015).
References
Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005). Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(4), 843–887.
Halpern, J. Y., & Hitchcock, C. (2015). Graded Causation and Defaults. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 66(2), 413–457.