A cynical view of SEMs

It is all too common for a box and arrow diagram to be cobbled together in an afternoon and christened a “theory of change”. One formalised version of such a diagram is a structural equation model (SEM), the arrows of which are annotated with coefficients estimated using data. Here is John Fox (2002) on SEM and informal boxology:

“A cynical view of SEMs is that their popularity in the social sciences reflects the legitimacy that the models appear to lend to causal interpretation of observational data, when in fact such interpretation is no less problematic than for other kinds of regression models applied to observational data. A more charitable interpretation is that SEMs are close to the kind of informal thinking about causal relationships that is common in social-science theorizing, and that, therefore, these models facilitate translating such theories into data analysis.”

References

Fox, J. (2002). Structural Equation Models: Appendix to An R and S-PLUS Companion to Applied Regression. Last corrected 2006.

Beautiful friendships have been jeopardised

This is an amusing opening to a paper on face validity, by Mosier (1947):

“Face validity is a term that is bandied about in the field of test construction until it seems about to become a part of accepted terminology. The frequency of its use and the emotional reaction which it arouses-ranging almost from contempt to highest approbation-make it desirable to examine its meaning more closely. When a single term variously conveys high praise or strong condemnation, one suspects either ambiguity of meaning or contradictory postulates among those using the term. The tendency has been, I believe, to assume unaccepted premises rather than ambiguity, and beautiful friendships have been jeopardized when a chance remark about face validity has classed the speaker among the infidels.”

I think dozens of beautiful friendships have been jeopardized by loose talk about randomised controlled trials, theory-based evaluation, realism, and positivism, among many others. I’ve just seen yet another piece arguing that you wouldn’t evaluate a parachute with an RCT and I can’t even.

References

Mosier, C. I. (1947). A Critical Examination of the Concepts of Face Validity. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 7(2), 191–205.

Evaluating the arts

I love the arts, particularly bouncy, moderately cheesy dance music experienced in a club. Programme evaluation has been poking at the arts for a while now and attempting to quantify their impact on wellbeing. And I really wish evaluators would stop and think what they’re doing before rushing in with a wellbeing questionnaire. The experience I have dancing in a sweaty club is very different to the experience wandering around Tate or crying in a cinema. Programme effects are contrasts: the actual outcome of the programme versus an estimate of what the outcome would have been in the programme’s absence, e.g., following some genre of “business as usual”. Before we can measure the average causal benefits of the arts we need a sensible theory of change, and some ideas about what the counterfactual is. Maybe you can find out how I feel dancing to Free Yourself, but what’s the contrast? Dancing to something else? Staying in with a cup of tea and chocolate, reading an article about standard errors for matching with replacement? What exactly is the programme being evaluated…? (End of random thoughts.)

Baseline balance in experiments and quasi-experiments

Baseline balance is important for both experiments and quasi-experiments, just not in the way researchers sometimes believe. Here are excerpts from three of my favourite discussions of the topic.

Don’t test for baseline imbalance in RCTs. Senn (1994,  p. 1716):

“… the following are two incontrovertible facts about a randomized clinical trial:

1. over all randomizations the groups are balanced;

2. for a particular randomization they are unbalanced.

Now, no ‘[statistically] significant imbalance’ can cause 1 to be untrue and no lack of a significant balance can make 2 untrue. Therefore the only reason to employ such a test must be to examine the process of randomization itself. Thus a significant result should lead to the decision that the treatment groups have not been randomized…”

Random sequence generators will randomise the groups. What can go wrong is that people can subvert the randomisation -sometimes with the best of intentions – if you’re not careful to prevent them doing so.

Balancing covariates between treatment groups, e.g., using permuted blocks or minimisation, can increase the efficiency of covariate adjustment. Senn (1994, p. 1721):

“… what is the value of balance as regards validity of an inference? Answer: none. This does not mean that balance is not useful. Its use is that, having decided to condition, we minimize the standard errors of our treatment effects if our covariate is orthogonal to treatment. This is the true value of balance which is an issue of efficiency, not validity.”

Do examine baseline imbalance in quasi-experiments; however, not by using statistical tests. Sample descriptives, such as a difference in means, suffice. Imai et al. (2008, p. 497):

“… from a theoretical perspective, balance is a characteristic of the sample, not some hypothetical population, and so, strictly speaking, hypothesis tests are irrelevant…”

Using p-values from t-tests and similar can lead to erroneous decisions of balance. As you prune a dataset to improve balance, power to detect effects decreases. Imai et al. (2008, p. 497 again):

“Since the values of […] hypothesis tests are affected by factors other than balance, they cannot even be counted on to be monotone functions of balance. The t-test can indicate that balance is becoming better whereas the actual balance is growing worse, staying the same or improving. Although we choose the most commonly used t-test for illustration, the same problem applies to many other test statistics…”

If your matching has led to baseline balance, then you’re good, even if the matching model is misspecified. (Though not if you’re missing key covariates, of course.) Rosenbaum (2023, p. 29):

“So far as matching and stratification are concerned, the propensity score and other methods are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. If matching for a misspecified and misestimated propensity score balances x, then that is fine. If by bad luck, the true propensity score failed to balance x, then the match is inadequate and should be improved.”

References

Imai, K., King, G., & Stuart, E. A. (2008). Misunderstandings between experimentalists and observationalists about causal inference. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 171(2), 481–502.

Rosenbaum, P. R. (2023). Propensity score. In J. R. Zubizarreta, E. A. Stuart, D. S. Small, & P. R. Rosenbaum, Handbook of Matching and Weighting Adjustments for Causal Inference (pp. 21–38). Chapman and Hall/CRC.

Senn, S. (1994). Testing for baseline balance in clinical trials. Statistics in Medicine, 13, 1715–1726.

Special issue dedicated to John Mayne

‘I am honoured to introduce this special issue dedicated to John Mayne, a “thought leader,” “practical thinker,” “bridge builder,” and “scholar practitioner” in the field of evaluation. Guest editors Steffen Bohni Nielsen, Sebastian Lemire, and Steve Montague bring together 14 colleagues whose articles document, analyze, and expand on John’s contributions to evaluation in the Canadian public service as well as his contributions to evaluation theory.’ –Jill A. Chouinard

Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation, Volume 37 Issue 3, March 2023

Regression to the mean

Suppose we were to run an uncontrolled pre-post evaluation of an intervention to alleviate psychological distress. We screen participants for distress and invite those with scores 1.5 SDs or more above the mean to take part. Then, following the intervention, we collect data on distress again to see if it has reduced. The measure we have chosen has a test-retest reliability of 0.8.

Here is a picture of simulated findings (scores have been scaled so that they have a mean of 0 and SD of 1). Red points denote data from people who have been included the study.

I have setup the simulation so that the intervention had no effect, in the sense that outcomes would have been identical in the absence of the intervention. However, looking at the right hand side, it appears that there has been a reduction in distress of 1.1 SDs – a huge effect. This is highly “statistically significant”, p < .001. What happened?!

Tweaking the simulation

Let’s try a different simulation. This time, without any screening, so everyone is included in the intervention regardless of their levels of distress (so all the data points are red):

Looking at the right hand side, the pre-post change is 0 and p is close to 1. There is no change.

Next, select participants whose scores are at the mean or above:

The pre-post change is now statistically significant again, with improvement of 0.27 SDs.

Select participants with more extreme scores, 1.5 SDs or above at baseline, and we see the magnitude of change has increased again:

What happens if we increase the test-retest reliability of the measure to 0.9?

Firstly, the scatterplot on the left is a little less fuzzy. The magnitude of change has reduced to 0.48 SDs.

Finally, let’s make the measure perfectly reliable so that the scatterplot on the left is a fuzz-free straight line:

Now there is no change.

What’s going on?

I have simulated the data so that the intervention had zero impact on outcomes, and yet for many of the analyses above it does appear to have alleviated distress.

The extent to which the effect illustrated above, called regression to the mean, occurs partly depends on how selective we are in inviting participants to join the study. At one extreme, if there is no selection, then the mean change is still zero. At the other extreme, when we are highly selective, then change is over 1 SD.

This is because by selecting people with particularly high scores at baseline, there’s an increased chance that we include people who had, for them, a statistically rare score. Perhaps they had a particularly bad day, which wasn’t indicative of their general levels of distress. Since we selected them when they happened to have a bad day, on measuring again after the intervention, there was a good chance they had a much less extreme score. But this reduction was entirely unrelated to the intervention. We know this because the simulation was setup so that the intervention had zero effect.

Making test-retest reliability perfect also eliminates regression to the mean. However, this is unlikely to be possible for most of the characteristics of people that are of interest for interventions.

You can play around with the app I developed to simulate the data over here.

Regression to the mean is just one reason why interventions can spuriously appear to have an effect. Carefully chosen control groups, where possible with random assignment to intervention or control, can take account of alternative explanations of change.

Evaluating What Works, by Dorothy Bishop and Paul Thompson

“Those who work in allied health professions aim to make people’s lives better. Often, however, it is hard to know how effective we have been: would change have occurred if we hadn’t intervened? Is it possible we are doing more harm than good? To answer these questions and develop a body of knowledge about what works, we need to evaluate interventions.

“As we shall see, demonstrating that an intervention has an impact is much harder than it appears at first sight. There are all kinds of issues that can arise to mislead us into thinking that we have an effective treatment when this is not the case. On the other hand, if a study is poorly designed, we may end up thinking an intervention is ineffective when in fact it is beneficial. Much of the attention of methodologists has focused on how to recognize and control for unwanted factors that can affect outcomes of interest. But psychology is also important: it tells us that own human biases can be just as important in leading us astray. Good, objective intervention research is vital if we are to improve the outcomes of those we work with, but it is really difficult to do it well, and to do so we have to overcome our natural impulses to interpret evidence in biased ways.”

(Over here.)

History repeating in psychedelics research

Interesting paper by Michiel van Elk and Eiko Fried (2023) on flawed evaluations of psychedelics to treat mental health conditions and how to do better. Neat 1966 quotation at the end:

“Given the current state of research, strong caution is warranted regarding the hype around psychedelics as treatments: there is not enough robust evidence to draw any firm conclusions about the safety and efficacy of psychedelic therapy. […] For psychedelic research in particular, we are not the first to raise concerns and can only echo the warning expressed more than half a century ago [Masters & Houston, 1966]:

“‘To be hopeful and optimistic about psychedelic drugs and their potential is one thing; to be messianic is another. Both the present and the future of psychedelic research already have been grievously injured by a messianism that is as unwarranted as it has proved undesirable.'”

References

Van Elk, M., & Fried, E. I. (2023). History repeating: Guidelines to address common problems in psychedelic science. Therapeutic Advances in Psychopharmacology, 13.

Tin openers versus dials

Neil Carter (1989, p. 134) on the limits of data dashboards and mindless use of KPIs:

“… the majority of indicators are tin-openers rather than dials: by opening up a ‘can of worms’ they do not give answers but prompt interrogation and inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate picture.”

Carter, N. (1989). Performance indicators: ‘Backseat driving’ or ‘hands off’control? Policy & Politics, 17(2), 131-138.